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Authoritarianism 
✓     Authoritarianism is understood here as a two-dimensional construct:  
 
✓    The unaccountable power of a single or collective ruler is underpinned by    
       the peoples „mentality‟, a leader‟s charisma, or the state coercive   
       apparatus   
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Theoretical background – congruence theory 
 According to the congruence theory, a regime is stable in so far as 
its authority pattern – the way it governs meets people’s authority 
beliefs – the way that political authority ought to govern 
 
 Democratic regimes are stable when most people have genuinely 
democratic authority beliefs 
 
 Authoritarian regimes are stable when most people believe in the 




✓  Ukrainians share mixed authority beliefs that are largely congruent with 
elites‟ hybrid authority pattern.  
 
 ✓  The resulting “hybrid congruence” alongside three groups of societal factors 




 The score of liberal understanding od democracy (LND) is twice 
higher than that of authoritarian understanding AND (0.82 to 0.41 
respectively) while emancipative values score is positive and 
growing from 0.38 in the 5th wave to 0.40 in the 6th wave (on 
the scale from – 1.60 to +2.80) 
 
 This signify that Ukrainians (a) share mixed – liberal and 
authoritarian notions of democracy, but (b) the former prevail and 
is supported by the positive score of emancipative values  
 
 This suggests that the prevalence of democratic beliefs would 




✓     Authoritarian congruence is hardly achievable in post-Euromaidan   
     Ukraine 
 
✓      Mixed, but largely democratic public attitudes prevent Ukraine   
      from moving in authoritarian directions. 
 
✓       It does not mean that authoritarian populist cannot be voted for  
       power in Ukraine. 
 
✓        There at least three groups of societal factors that prevent  
       him/her from consolidating power and establish some sort of   
       authoritarian rule.    
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Structural impediments 
✓   Poor leadership legitimacy  
 
✓   Poor economy performance 
 
✓   Regional polarization  
 
✓   Fragmented elite structure  
 
✓   The relative weakness of the ‘party of power’ 
 
✓   Weak state repressive capacity  
 
✓   The growing linkage with the West 
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Leadership legitimacy 
✓    In a period 2000-2015  the full support of the president has been around 14       
      % average, the support of the parliament and the cabinet has been less     
      than 10 % (6.5 and 9.6. respectively)  
✓     Before the 2019 presidential election, none of the major politicians or    
      candidates had a positive balance of trust and distrust 
✓     In September 2019 Zelensky enjoyed a comfortable 73 percent of support,   
       but by April 2020 he lost 30 percent, which exceeded the losses of    
       Yanukovych and in par with that of Yushchenko  
✓      In June 2020 the number of those who disapprove his actions (45 percent)   
       for the first time exceeded the number of those who approve (38 percent)  
       and the balance turned negative by seven percent 
✓      In November 2019 the number of those who thought the events are  
       moving in the right direction for the first time became lower than those who   
       thought differently (36 to 39 present respectively). By November 2020 the   










✓    Autocrats face serious constraints in consolidating their power in regionally 
and culturally divided societies 
 
✓    Homogenous identity facilitate not only democratization, but also 
autocratization  
 
✓    Divisions within titular national identity is more important than competition 
between titular nation and minorities  
 
✓    Identity divisions facilitate mobilization of opposition and undermines elites 
unity 
 
✓    Examples: Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia vs. Belarus, Turkmenistan, Russia, 
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Fragmented elite 
✓    Regional and identity divisions hinder the formation of unified elite – an 
important factor of any regime consolidation 
 
✓    Ukrainian elite inherited the fragmented structure – neither ideocratic nor 
consensual consolidation, therefore, was successful 
 
✓    When various elite factions compete for influence (and rents), none of them 
can monopolize power  
 
✓    Elite fragmentation persisted after the 2014 and 2019 electoral cycles. Now 
the major division lies between pro and anti-reformers in parliament on the 
one hand, and between „the oligarch in power‟ and „oligarch outside power‟ 
(with Poroshenko and Kolomoisky switching their positions) on the other  
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Weak party and state repressive capacity 
✓    Weak parties undermine the incumbent capacity to monopolize power 
 
✓    Parties organizational weakness is the effect of oligarchization – most 
parties are „political machines‟ created from above  
 
✓    Most of the Ukrainian parties, including lefts and rights, are not 
programmatic, but clientelistic organizations  
 
✓    Weak „party of power‟ constrains the incumbents‟ ability to repress 
effectively  
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Linkage with the West 
✓    The higher the linkage - the harder it is for incumbent to „rule without limits‟ 
 
✓    High linkage (through EU AA and dependency on western financial and 
security aid) makes regime more democratic 
 
✓    Russia‟s factor: Putin‟s aggression against Ukraine made the civilizational 
divorce apparently irreversible  
 
✓    After Ukrainian Orthodox Church has gained independence from Moscow 




✓    Semi-presidentialism is a system where the executive power is divided 
between the president and prime minister.  
 
✓    A divided executive system resulted in a more competitive and open 
regime, or „competing pyramid system‟, whereas single executive system 
leads to the less competitive and more closed regime – „single pyramid 
system‟ 
 
✓    One effect of a divided executive system is internal instability, yet the 
institutionally implanted conflict between the president and the prime – 
minister is a fundamental barrier against concentrating power in one hand 
 
✓    There has been six shifts within the semi-presidential system (1991, 1995, 
1996, 2004, 2010 and 2014). Inability to centralize the executive power is a 
sign of incumbent weakness and society‟s distaste for purely presidential 
system .     
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Institutional constraints 
✓   ‘Institutionalized hybridity‟, or the legacy of being a hybrid regime for 
about a quarter of century 
 
✓    Hybrid means competitive elections, but prevalence of subversive 
institutions (clientelism, corruption, secretive elite deals) over Constitution 
and legal norms 
 
✓    The hybrid regime in Ukraine coalesced under Kuchma and survived both 
the Orange and the Euromaidan revolutions 
 
✓    It is an institutional trap that became a factor of elite‟s authority pattern 
 
✓    This regime is preferred by the elites as it allows for extracting rent without 
turning to outright violence 
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Agency- based constraints 
✓    Lack of charismatic leadership 
 
✓    None of the post-independence politicians (except for Zelensky‟s first half a 
year in office) enjoyed at least 50 percent of public support over the tenure 
 
✓    It does not mean that a charismatic strongman could ever come to power, 
but to emphasize that personalism, as a legitimating strategy, has never 
reached the level of a personalist cult in Ukraine, like it is in Russia, 
Belarus, Hungary, or Turkey. 
 
✓    The threat that a charismatic autocrat would be able to abuse the 
presidency for his ends appears quite dismal in post-Euromaidan Ukraine. 
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Agency- based constraints 
✓    Like no other post-soviet state, Ukraine has a history of successful anti-
authoritarian mobilizations (1990, 2004, 2014) 
 
✓    In the Orange and Euromaidan revolutions, participated some 18- 20 
percent of adult citizens, which is between 5-7 million people. 
 
✓    The protest potential remains relatively high in Ukraine (in November 2019, 
48 percent express readiness to take part in various forms of protests 
 
✓    The trigger has so far been of non-material nature (stolen elections and 
stolen European dream) 
 
✓    Given the steady growth of emancipative values, „the freedom factor‟– the 
ability to mobilize in defense of freedom has to be taken as an important 




✓    Any attempt to impose the authoritarian rule from above would face the 
cumulative resistant effect produced by three groups of structural, 
institutional, and agency based factors 
 
✓    The group of structural factors (8 out of 12) seems to be the hardest ones to 
overcome for any aspiring autocrat 
 
✓    Institutionalized hybridity – the state of being a hybrid regime for more than 
two decades is generally congruent with the mixed (mostly democratic but 
also some paternalistic) people‟s authority beliefs  
 
✓    Ukrainians share mixed – liberal and authoritarian notions of democracy, 
but the former prevail and are supported by the positive score of 
emancipative values (0.40 on the scale from – 1.00 to +1.00)  
 
✓    Even moderate, but positive growth of emancipative values index (0.5) from 
the mid-90s to mid-2000s is not conductive to authoritarianism  
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Conclusions 
✓    Ukraine has to cope not with authoritarianism, but:  
 
✓    Growing social populism 
 
✓    Involution of the constitutionalism and the rule of law 
 
✓    If not constraint, these will likely lead to:  
 
✓    Weakening of the state‟s governing capacity   
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